The contingency argument seeks to establish the existence of God, based on the contingency of things in the world. Contingency is the absence of necessity. A contingent thing, therefore, is not necessary. It could have been different. It could have not existed at all. The contingency argument, then, argues from the contingency of things to the need for a Being that is not contingent, but necessary. This being would be required for all contingent beings to exist. There are a number of different versions of the contingency argument for God’s existence. Here’s one of them.
Felix the cat is a contingent reality. In other words, the reason why Felix exists is because certain, prior states of existence caused—and concurrently cause—Felix to be.[1] For example: from the procreative act of Felix’s parents, to the concurrent existence of the earth’s atmosphere, electromagnetic fields and so on, some conditions explain what brought Felix into existence, whereas other conditions explain what *keeps* Felix in existence.
Is Everything Contingent?
From this basic, undeniable observation we can ask a simple but provocative question: could everything in reality be contingent upon some prior set of conditions being fulfilled in order to exist? In short, could everything have a cause external to it?
The answer to this question is, emphatically, “no.” The reason is because to say that all of reality is contingent is also to say that all of reality depends, in order to exist, upon the fulfillment of a set of conditions—which is impossible. For beyond “all of reality” there is literally nothing; and from nothing comes nothing. If all of reality was contingent, then reality could never exist, which is absurd because it does exist.
And so, we are forced to conclude that not everything in reality is contingent. While most everything we encounter is contingent, there must be at least one non-contingent, and therefore necessary reality in order to explain why any contingent thing exists rather than nothing.
Necessary Reality: Essence & Existence
If there is a necessary reality, then the next question is what could this necessary reality be? Here’s one way we can figure that out: we can distinguish between the “essence” and the “existence” of things.
When we talk about what something is—whether a lion, a mouse, or an electron—we’re referring to its essence. And when we talk about the fact that something is, we’re talking about its existence. And contingency is when the existence of something depends upon prior circumstances. Something is contingent, then, insofar as its essence—the “what-ness” of it—is truly distinct from its existence—the “is-ness” of it. Here’s another way to think about it: The “what” of any contingent reality doesn’t determine its inclusion in reality; “what” something is, doesn’t cause it to “be.” Other things external to it do.
Let’s explain more. We can know the essence of something without knowing whether that something exists. Describe a lion, unicorn, and pterodactyl to an overly sheltered person, then ask which one currently exists, which one never existed, and which one has gone extinct. But it’s clear from a mere understanding of the essence alone, one could not determine the answer. Rather, a person would have to empirically investigate. This thought experiment is one of various clues for what’s called the “real distinction” between any contingent essence, and its existence. Another line of support for the “real distinction” is our observation of many things coming into existence and departing. This shows they do not exist necessarily. But if their essence and existence were not truly distinct, then such beings would exist necessarily.
What, then, is the necessary reality? We can argue that for whatever exists necessarily – that is, for anything whose essence just is existence – there can only be one such thing, and such a thing must be inherently unlimited. Otherwise, if we say that “to exist” is identical with any limited[2] mode of existence, then we commit ourselves to the absurdity that anything which exists must exist as that particular mode of existence. For example, if we’re to say that “to exist” = “existing as an electron” then anything which exists would be an electron. But clearly this is not the case. There are protons, anti-electrons, etc. So, whatever exists necessarily must not be a limited, finite being. It must be pure existence itself; and therefore, unrestricted. Only then can other things also exist in various, limited ways.[3]
Therefore, since there must be at least one necessary (non-contingent) being, there must be at least one qualitatively unlimited being — that is, the necessary being must also be unlimited. It must be a being whose essence is existence, as such; and so it must have no essential set of limits, restrictions, or boundaries on what it is, what it knows, or what it can do. But that kind of being we would call “God.”
God as the “Necessary Reality” That Explains Existence
Now, why call such a being “God?”
For one thing, this necessary reality must be the ultimate, grounding explanation for why anything else exists. In short, it is the ultimate cause of everything apart from itself. And surely, if God is anything, God is the ultimate cause of everything else which exists.
But even more, if we think about the implications of what it means to be qualitatively unlimited, we’ll eventually arrive at various attributes which are traditionally ascribed to God. For example, to be unlimited in power (that is, the ability to produce an effect) is to be omnipotent. Also, to be unlimited in knowledge (itself a power) is to be omniscient. Furthermore, to be free of any limits with respect to space and time—since to be restricted in existence to some material form, place, or time, is obviously a limit—is to be immaterial and eternal.
In other words, we have deduced an all-powerful, all-knowing, immaterial, and eternal being which exists in virtue of what it is, and which provides the ultimate explanation for why anything—including itself—exists. While further arguments are required to prove the truth of Christianity, most would agree that everything just described amounts to a common (though minimal) conception of God.
Example Dialogue
Now that we’ve heard the argument, let’s see what it might look like in a real-life conversation.
Evangelist stands near a street corner with rosaries in hand. He smiles and says hello to passerby.
Evangelist: Would you like a rosary?
Passerby: Sure. What do I do with it? [Passerby (P) takes the rosary and looks at it]
Evangelist [E]: They’re prayer beads. By saying certain prayers at each bead, it helps focus the mind both to meditate on and understand the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus.
P: Oh, you know I’m actually an atheist so praying isn’t something I do really.
E: Interesting. The term “atheist” can cover a lot of ground. What does the term mean to you?
P: It means I don’t believe in God, or, well, at least I don’t really think there are any compelling reasons to believe in the existence of some all-mighty creator.
E: [E nods understandingly] You know, I used to grapple with those thoughts as well, but through a lot of study, I found there are actually a lot of really solid arguments that brought me to a belief in God.
P: [dismissively] Yeah, I’ve heard different people give some rather nutty, emotional arguments before. I’m not interested in anything like that.
E: I understand that; may I give you one good reason that I find to be particularly interesting? It is called the Contingency Argument. Have you heard of it?
P: [shakes his head] No, I can’t say that I have. Go ahead.
E: Here’s a simple formulation: If something exists, there’s a sufficient explanation for it, and that explanation is found either in something else, or in itself. From there, we add that the universe exists. But the universe doesn’t explain itself. It’s contingent, finite. It’s possible that it could never have existed at all, or some other universe could have existed. So, there must be an explanation beyond the universe to account for its existence. And since the universe is all of space, time, matter, and energy, then something must transcend these things. Which pretty much leaves us with only one option: an immaterial, all-powerful creator. Namely, God.
P: OK, but then why doesn’t God need an explanation?
E: He does! God doesn’t escape the initial premise; rather, God’s explanation is included in his very nature, as a necessary being.
P: But isn’t that unnecessary? Why couldn’t the universe just be the necessary being?
E: I think there’s a couple reasons. First, modern cosmology currently points to a time when the universe came into existence—by modern estimates, some 13.8 billion years ago. If the universe came into existence at that point, then it clearly doesn’t exist necessarily. Second, the universe is just the collection of all physical, finite things. And none of these things seems to possess a necessary quality about them, since we can easily conceive of planets, or atoms or particles not existing, or of a universe composed of entirely different stuff. For these reasons, I think the universe is clearly contingent and so requires an external cause of its existence.
P: OK, but then why does God not need a cause?
E: Remember, the argument doesn’t say everything needs a cause—it only says that everything needs an explanation. Not all explanations are causes, even if all causes are explanations. For example: We’ve already said how God’s explanation of existence is found in his having a special nature or essence, which most philosophers would argue is existence as such. So we aren’t arbitrarily exempting God from this principle of explanation.
However, your question of God needing a cause can lend further clarification to the argument. It seems clear that not everything can have a cause. And by “everything,” I simply mean the totality of all that exists or once existed. Because, apart from everything, there is … well, nothing. And nothing comes from nothing! Therefore, I think we can be certain that at least something—and perhaps only one thing—doesn’t, and couldn’t, have a cause; otherwise everything would be dependent upon nothing to bring it into existence. So, in this sense, it’s merely a matter of unpacking what such an uncaused reality could be, and it seems like an eternal, transphysical act of existence, in other words, “God,” is the best explanation.
P: What’s wrong with saying everything came from nothing?
E: If things could pop into existence from nothing, then we could expect that to happen a lot more frequently. But I can’t think of this happening, not even once—can you? As much as I would love my wallet to spontaneously fill with money, I don’t see that as being a reasonable expectation. And certainly if a pile of money appeared right in front of us, our natural inclination would be to start looking for explanations—maybe teleportation or something, who knows. But I doubt we’d seriously consider the money popping into existence from nothing, at least not without trying to exhaust other possible explanations.
Also, if things can exist for no reason whatever—literally, just pop into being from nothing—then it seems like scientific and philosophical investigation would hit a real snag.
P: How’s that?
E: Well, maybe what we thought were explanations weren’t really explanations at all. For example, instead of humans evolving, maybe we just popped into existence from nothing! Also, if things can happen for no reason whatever, then maybe our beliefs can occur for no reason whatever—which means that we should be extremely skeptical of all our beliefs—including the belief that things can happen for no reason whatever. So, I think the objection of things coming into existence from nothing undercuts itself.
P: OK, this definitely gives me something to think about. I don’t know if I’m “convinced”, but I’m willing to think more about this. Thanks for the conversation.
E: Hey, that’s great! But before you go, would you mind if I recommended some further reading? I really appreciate you putting deep thought into matters of religion and faith, so I think you’d probably really enjoy much of what the Catholic Church has to offer.
P: Sure, what do you have?
[E hands out material]
Conclusion
So we’ve looked at one version of the argument from contingency. When making that argument yourself, remember to emphasize how the contingency argument is not so much asking what brought things into existence some very long time ago (that’s the next argument), but rather, what keeps anything in existence here and now. This argument demonstrates not only God’s existence, but God’s providence for everything he’s made, since as the Necessary Being, He is continually donating “being” to everything else in reality.
[1] Concurrent – operating or occuring at the same time (Merriam-Webster).
[2] “Limited” means whatever exists in some specific way, and/or with some particular set of abilities, and/or at some specific time, place, etc.
[3] That is, something else can cause things to exist in various particular, limited, and finite modes of being.